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QUESTIONS POSED
ROBERT LAURENCE*

It is my task to conclude the Symposium. The editors of the North
Dakota Law Review envisioned my role here as that of the "Reporter"
of the Symposium, stating conclusions, by consensus where it existed, or
following discord, where necessary. I resisted the role of "Reporter,"
thinking it inappropriate in the context of this Symposium. The focus
was too diffuse, the discussion too wide-ranging, for concluding
resolutions to be convincing, or fair, even, to the many participants.
So, rather than by giving answers, I will conclude the Symposium
by framing the questions presented by our discussions, creating the
docket, if you will, for the next time the participants in this Symposium
get together. Mindful of the adage that he who gets to state the question
controls the answer, I will attempt to rein in any inclination to advance
my own agenda in the process. We shall see.
With a Symposium as wide-ranging as this one, a lengthy list of
questions is tempting, but I will resist the temptation. These questionsin-conclusion will aim not for comprehensibility, but for provocation;
these questions are the ones the seem to me to be the most interesting
follow-ups, even if they are not the ones most practically significant.
There will be eight.
1. The foundation question: "So what?"
I begin by noting that one question, as always, is at the heart of all
of Indian law, the one put to me by a student several years ago, and used
by me regularly since. 1 The student noted that all of Indian law is based
on one fact and one question: "They were here first" and "So what?"
The "So what?" question is not dismissive of the importance of the
fact of indigenousness, but a reminder that every Indian law principle
must be related to this essential fact of North American life: that not so
long ago as such things are measured, Europeans, Africans and Asians
were entirely occupied with tending to the affairs of Europe, Africa and
Asia. That fact leads us to certain results, those results justifying a field
known as American Indian law. Which results? There's the rub, and
Ms. Jackson's question always reminds us to make the connection, if we
can, between indigenousness and the particular result urged.
Professor Frickey of the University of Minnesota makes the same
point somewhat more formally this way:
* Robert A. Leflar Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
I. Often without attribution, a sin I hereby attempt to rectify: The student was Patricia Jackson.
now Compton, an attorney in El Dorado, Arkansas.
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[B]y masking the essential differences between the legal and
cultural situations of Native Americans and of America's racial
minorities, this conceptualization is antagonistic to the most
basic claim put forward by American Indians: the claim to be
free from assimilative forces and to make and be governed by
their own laws ...
With all due respect, the commentators are wrong to
categorize the Indian law canon [of statutory and treaty
construction] as designed to protect disadvantaged minorities.2
Thus, if Indians are entitled to self-determination, it is not because
of their generally impoverished condition, nor is self-determination
dependent upon disadvantage. Rather, they were here first. "It must
always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government." 3
How far does self-determination extend, given that it does not
extend as far as opening a Cuban embassy in Fort Totten? All of Indian
law is wrapped up in that question, and it must be addressed within the
context of my student's formulation. Hence, I begin these questionsin-conclusion in a fundamentally pedestrian way, by expressly raising
the "So what?" question.
2. The over-arching question: "What role history?"
It is becoming increasingly obvious to me that the "So what?"
question is related to a second question: What is the role of history in
Indian law? It appears that Indian legal history is making a serious
attempt to dominate the field. The latest edition of the Getches,
Wilkinson & Williams casebook devotes the first 288 pages-more than
a quarter of the entire text-to history. 4 The recent Georgia Law Review
Symposium on Indian law consisted entirely, save one, of historical
pieces (the exception being an article co-authored by Sam Deloria and
me.)5 Professor Valencia-Weber of the University of New Mexico
recently published a defense of history as the mainstay of the Indian law
course. 6
The present Symposium was more contemporary than historical,
one suspects because of the initial determination to tie the panels to Boyd
2. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381,424-25 (1993).
3. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,172 (1973).
4. DAVID H. GErCmES ET AL., FEDERAL INDiAN LAw (3d ed. 1993).
5. See 28 GA. L. REv. 299 (1994).
6. Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors, 44 J. LErAL
ED. 251 (1994).
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& McWilliams. Energy Group v. Tso,7 an actual, contemporary,
litigated-but-unreported case. 8 Or perhaps the historians were overwhelmed by the early shaping of this Symposium by Sam Deloria and
me, mentioned above as the out-of-step here-and-now-ites in the
Georgia Law Review Symposium.
History, however, did not go entirely ignored in Grand Forks; Bob
Clinton, one of the leading historians of Indian law, related in the
Symposium the maxim that "those who forget history are forced to
repeat it." I offer in exchange Lawrence Durrell's less well known
skeptical observation that: "Confused by our clumsy gestures of
interpretation, history is never kind to those who expect anything of her.
Under the formal pageant of events which we have dignified by our
interest, the land changes very little, and the structure of the basic self of
man hardly at all."9
What role history? There has been, around the American Indian
Law Center for a number of years, a thought experiment that goes by the
name of "Washington's Letter." Imagine that a letter is newly
discovered amongst George Washington's papers: "Friends, fellow
Founding Fathers and Framers of the Constitution," the letter begins,
I think it might be useful to memorialize our mutual understanding of the respect we hold for the doctrine of Indian tribal
sovereignty, and the course we envision for that doctrine as the
country expands into what is now the sacred territory of the
populations indigenous to this continent we now call our home.
The letter then goes on for many pages, setting forth all of the
principles of American Indian law that the truest of 1990s tribal
advocates might hope for, from the sanctity of Indian treaties, to the
illegitimacy of the plenary power, to the inapplicability of state cigarette
taxation laws to reservation transactions, to the details of the awarding of
indirect costs on 638 contracts. There, in Washington's own hand,
republished in full in the New York Times and Indian Country Today, is
what the Framers thought the law was then and should be now.
What changes?
"Nothing," say the here-and-now-ites.
"Everything," say the original-understanders.

7. No. 93-C-1083A (C.D. Utah Dec. 17, 1993).
8. Boyd & McWilliams Energy Group v. Tso, No. 93-C-1083A (C.D. Utah Dec. 17, 1993).
9. LAWRENCE DURRELL, PROSPERO'S CELL: A GUIDE TO THE LANDSCAPE AND MANNERS OF THE
ISLAND OF CORCYRA 59 (Penguin ed. 1978).
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And all the positions in between. We leave Grand Forks, then, as we
leave all good Symposia, with the fundamental question: What role does
history play in the formation and application of Indian law doctrine?
3. From the Litigation Panel: "What legitimate role, if any, does
forum shopping play?"
We have seen in the Symposium a certain tension between the
litigators and the theorists, a tension that is part of the larger noncongruence between the proclivities and responsibilities of those two
groups. The theorists address themselves to the part the law-whether
that be legislative, executive or judicial "law"-plays in ensuring, or not,
that tribal sovereignty stays alive as an active part of twentieth and twentyfirst century jurisprudence. Not all theorists are tribal advocates, of
course, and even within the rubric the spectrum is wide, but at issue for
all theorists is the policy question of whether and how tribal sovereignty
remains alive.
Litigators zealously represent their clients within the bounds of the
law. It has occurred to me during the course of this Symposium that this
tension comes perilously close to outright contradiction when the issue
is, as it has largely been here, the rules of civil adjudication. Whatever
rules the theorists set up, we cannot expect other than that the litigators
will attempt to manipulate the rules to the advantage of their clients, the
theoretical niceties of tribal sovereignty be damned.
Furthermore, and 'susceptible as this field is to political ramifications, Indian-law theorists must propose rules which are perceived by the
litigators to give both sides a fair shot at winning. We must never forget
the practical implications of Indian law's two-edged sword: we are
dealing with a very small segment of American society, but one which
has a very high moral claim to self-determination. The morality of the
claim often keeps tribal concerns from being simply out-voted, but the
dominant society's institutions can only be prodded so far, and at some
point they generally balk, and the forces of the super-majority take hold.
In this Symposium, these issues have focused themselves, pragmatically, on the question of forum shopping, largely on the precise question
of Phil Lear and Blake Miller's choice to bring Boyd & McWilliams v.
Tso initially in the United States, not Navajo, District Court. In the
dominant society's courts, forum shopping is a sin venial, if at all,
subject to legitimate regulation, which regulations are subject in turn to
legitimate avoidance techniques and loop-holing. Suspecting that, when
it comes to tribal courts, the non-Indian forum shoppers-meaning here,
the attorneys for the non-Indian litigants-are inclined to do their
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business elsewhere,10 the theorists were generally inclined to place more
or less severe restrictions, either common-law or statutory, on the practice
of avoiding tribal courts. Phil Lear called that "affirmative action for
tribal courts," and appropriate umbrage was taken.
Forum shopping, in turn, implicates the full faith and credit
question. If tribal courts must give unquestioned deference to federal
and state court judgments, then the plaintiff's ability to shop first in
those non-Indian courts takes on an added dimension. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff must first go to tribal court, then the question turns
around, and it becomes important to know whether, when and how the
federal and state courts must honor tribal judgments.
There.were no resolutions in this area so important to the existence
and management of civil-side litigation over reservation disputes, but I
am left with this question from the Litigation Panel: How can the law be
structured by the legislature or the courts so that the understandable
zealousness and single-mindedness of the litigators does not prevent the
friendly evolution of the law, while giving them a fair chance of
winning?
4. From the Trust Panel: "How does the theory apply in
practice?"
Any discussion of the federal trusteeship raises what might be called
the "standard" questions: Does the trusteeship survive at all? Or is it
merely colonial paternalism in twentieth century garb? Is it the same as
a private trusteeship? And what about sovereign immunity, in that
unique Indian-law circumstance where the trustee is the government?
And, in which court must allegations of breach of the fiduciary
responsibility be litigated?
But, in keeping with the pragmatic sensibilities of this Symposium, I
choose to put aside those fundamental and largely theoretical questions
in favor of a practical one: On the ground, day-to-day, what does the
trusteeship mean in meetings? How does it change, or not, the behavior
of those mid-level bureaucrats in the various departments of the
government who make decisions that influence reservation life? How are
conflicts of interest avoided, managed, co-opted or resolved by those
"trustees" at those meetings.
Are those mid-level bureaucrats
"trustees" at all, or is it only their bosses, at the heady bureaucratic
altitudes of Presidential appointments, who wear the fiduciary hat?
10. Sam Deloria made what should have been the obvious point: that impoverished communities
are rarely adverse to a little healthy economic development, and that one should not arm oneself with
an unshakable predisposition that the non-Indian forces of capital will be treated shoddily before
Indian institutions. Cf. Boyd & McWilliams Energy Group v. Tso (No. 93-c-1083A (C.D. Utah Dec.
17, 1993).
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Bill Rice raised the question of the grudging interpretation by the
BIA of the state of the law during the years between Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache TribeIl and Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe.12 The former held
that inherent tribal power to tax non-Indians exists, at least where the
Interior Department had- approved of the tax;13 the latter denied that
there was any federal approval required. 14 Was it, we wondered, a
violation of the trusteeship for the BIA's lawyers to take a niggardly
view of the reach of Merrion, the view ultimately proved wrong in
Kerr-McGee? Rice thought yes; I was skeptical; Sam Deloria cautioned
that the question itself missed the mark.
And it was this missing of the mark that leads to the questionin-conclusion, for it seems to me that, in the area of the trusteeship, it is
especially difficult for one to know if the question is the right one.
Justice, then Judge, Cardozo, with his usual ability to make one proud to
speak English, defined the fiduciary duty to be "[n]ot honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive .... Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd." 15 But, also somewhat typically of Cardozo's
masterful prose, it's rather difficult to know what he means. And so the
question-in-conclusion: Even with Cardozo's aphorism cross-stitched
and framed on the wall of a room in the area office in Aberdeen, how is
the meeting run? Who is in charge? Who hollers, "Wait!"? How does
the trusteeship work?
5. From the Diminishment Panel: "Whither the ICRA?"
This panel, of course, was mine, at least to the extent that I presented
the paper-in-chief. So, I have already had my say, my neutrality is
absent beyond question, and I will not take more space than is necessary
to ask this question: What is the future of the Indian Civil Rights Act?
Am I right in thinking that it has a role to play in the preservation, as
opposed to the destruction, of tribal sovereignty? Is that good or bad?
What are the alternatives? If something like the ICRA could serve, what
changes should be made in the statute?
6. From the Environmental Panel: "Do tribes get 'a seat at the
table' without 'buying into the whole thing'?"
I am new to environmental law, new to the convoluted statutes and
the volumes of regulations, new to the economic analysis, new to the
scientific jargon, new to the politics. Those politics were very active as
11. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
12. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
13. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 139 (1982).
14. Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195,201 (1985).
15. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
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the Symposium met and, one supposes, will remain so at least through
the end of the century. It seems to me that what the nation wants is clean
air and water, without a large governmental bureaucracy to bring that
about. I don't know how to do that, but I'll listen to suggestions.
With regard to environmental issues on the reservations, the panelists
introduced us to federal water pollution control and how tribes do, or
should, fit into that scheme. Would the regulations come down from
above, or up from the bottom? Would decision-making be hierarchical,
or by consensus? Would the model change when the local government
becomes Isleta, rather than Albuquerque? And how can Isleta live
downstream from Albuquerque at all? How can it not?
In the midst of all the discussion from the panel, I heard two phrases
that caught my attention; sadly, my notes don't precisely identify the
speaker, but I think it was Rebecca Tsosie speaking in response to John
Harbison's paper. Anyway, two phrases caught my ear: "Buying into
the whole thing," and "A seat at the table." The first captured for me
the usual theoretical problem of Indian law: how do the tribes retain
their differences, outnumbered as they are by the dominant society?
The second captured for me the usual practical problem for Indians:
how do they get into the room and at the table where decisions that
affect reservation life are made?
So, in a way, I propose, as my "question-in-conclusion" to the
environmental panel, issues that are entirely non-unique to environmental concerns. On the theoretical side, it is tribal difference that makes
Indian law important. The law recognizes, and has done so from the
beginning, that tribal governments may deviate from dominant-society
norms in ways that other domestic governments-even governments that
are largely or entirely made up of minorities-may not.
Tribes, then, are generally permitted by the courts to "buy into"
the system with less than a full commitment to the system's values. For
example, the American Constitution does not bind tribal activity, 16 and
its surrogate, the Indian Civil Rights Act, does not contain an Establishment Clause, so while the rest of us decide whether or not we can pray at
graduation, tribal schools can do as they choose, at least under federal
law.
The environmental panel stated this question focused on clean water
and air, and surely it is there: does a tribe have to ascribe to the same
environmental principles as the dominant society, be those "principles"
ones requiring certain minimum levels of dissolved oxygen in water,
certain maximum levels of particulates in the air, certain minimum
16. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 US. 376 (1896).
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numbers of endangered species, or certain technical requirements for
reservation landfills? If "cost-benefit analysis" is the dominant
society's primary principle of future environmental regulation, as I read
it to be from the papers, does the tribe get to do the balancing itself,
based on its own perhaps different estimation of costs, benefits and the
working of the balance?
More to the point, is it a "you're in or you're out" deal, or will we
continue, in this area of the field as in the others, to recognize that tribes
can "buy in" only part way, as states cannot?
Related to that question, is the practical one: do tribes get a seat at
the decision-makers' table? Again, we return to the essential practical
quandary of Indian law, that there are a very few Indians on very high
moral ground. Sure, Indians may never have been fully "green" in the
New Age or Earth First sense, but they were just as surely managing the
continent centuries ago, and managing it at least as well as it is being
managed now. Better. So, they deserve, in a moral sense, a place at the
decision-makers' table. But how do they get it, and do they get it
notwithstanding that, because of the theory mentioned just above, they
choose not to play every hand, and don't always play by the same rules
as the rest of the players?
So, do Indians get both? Do they get to buy into the system only
partially and how do they ensure themselves of input at the important
junctures? All of this, of course, affects how clean or dirty the air and
water and land will be on the reservation, and upstream, downstream,
upwind and downwind from there.
7. From the Tribal-Court-State-Court Presentation: "How is it done
in the absence of Chief Justice Erickstad's status and respect?"
Think of Indian law in the '50s: tribes and states were, at times,
bitter enemies, the governments closest to the problems, fighting for
jurisdiction, with the states often refusing to recognize the tribes as
governments. Congress and the Executive were pursuing the ugly
termination policy. The Supreme Court was often the protector of tribal
sovereignty, for example in cases such as Williams v. Lee.17
Times change.
Now the Congress and the Executive show more respect for the
grand doctrine than does the Supreme Court, and tribes and states are, in
some cases, actively cooperating as sovereign governments. This
tribal-state cooperation is as encouraging a development as we have seen

17. 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that the exercise of state jurisdiction over reservation affairs
would undermine the authority of tribal courts).
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in Indian law for some time, and, whether the issue is gambling, full faith
and credit, education or social services, it is often where the action is.18
That action can be smooth or rough, or both at the same time.
Chief Justice Erickstad showed the Symposium how it works at its best,
but the problem is the one he would be too modest to agree with: there
is considerable evidence to suggest that it is he who made the cooperation work. When a person with the former Chief Justice's stature from
the dominant society's bench and bar devotes himself in retirement to
the project of making a "New Beginning" in tribal-court-state-court
relations, the job is half done. Well, at least half started. The devil, of
course, is in the details, but still and all, the dedication of his goodwill
and prestige to the task must surely have made the going, if not easy,
then far easier than without.
But not every state or tribe has an Erickstad, and what then? Sam
Deloria gave his insight, from a perspective of many years' experience
in tribal-state relations, in a recent article in the Georgia Law Review's
Indian law symposium. 19 I self-consciously note that I was his co-author
on that article, but hastily assure you that my half of the article was
rather standard egghead stuff, much of which has appeared elsewhere.
But Sam's half was revolutionary-for the law reviews, at least-by
taking on the issues involved in the tribal-state negotiations themselves,
largely separate from the underlying merits.
Take, for instance, the issue of compliance with whatever agreement
is reached. With an Erickstad-and his tribal counterparts-at the table,
the compliance question may seem moot. But North Dakota Attorney
General Heitkamp introduced us non-Dakotans to the current dispute
between the executive and legislative branches of the state government
over compliance with an agreement between the governor of the state
and the various tribes. In Sam's half of the article just mentioned, he
addresses the question of compliance, and the role that anticipated
non-compliance should play during the negotiation process and in the
formal agreement itself. I urge those interested in the tribal-state
negotiation process to study those words with care.

18. Recent articles outlining some successful and not-so-successful tribal-state negotiations
include Kevin Gover et al., Tribal-State Dispute Resolution: Recent Attempts, 36 S.D. L. REv. 277
(1991) and Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239
(1991). See also DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at 604-05 (discussing full faith and
credit), 726-27 (discussing jurisdictional disputes), and 858 (discussing wildlife management) (3d ed.
1993).
19. See P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal State Full Faith and Credit
Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365
(1994).
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In the end, tribal-state relations must survive even a non-benign
United States Supreme Court and the absence of persons of Chief Justice
Erickstad's goodwill at the table. The topic of how that is managed is
opened by Sam's article in the Georgia Law Review and by the Chief
Justice's article here, but the resolutions are not clear. The questionin-conclusion, then: How do we ensure that the negotiations continue
when they stop being easy?
8. From the Abstention Panel: "Do non-Indian analogies work?"
Here's one thing we know: Indian tribes are neither foreign nations,
nor states, nor private voluntary organizations. Indian law can rarely,
then, be drawn directly from the law respecting those other entities. But
does analogy work? For example, given a reasonably settled non-Indian
federal court abstention doctrine, can, must or should an Indian federal
court abstention doctrine be made to fit in?
I begin by noting the vagaries of arguing by analogy. Alex Skibine
has recently taken the courts to task, in his most polite way, for failing to
reason by analogy from a non-Indian, administrative law opinion, to
Indian law. 20 Nearly simultaneously, Professor David Williams took the
courts to task, somewhat more abruptly, for using an analogy from
non-Indian to Indian law. 2 1 Professor David Williams criticized Justice
Scalia for the Court's blithe and ill-considered analogy, while Professor
Skibine thought the Ninth Circuit missed the opportunity, even in
reaching the correct result on the merits, to proclaim the validity of a
non-Indian analogy.
The key, of course, is whether an analogy is ill- or well-considered,
and that is the question with respect to federal court abstention. Having
determined that some cases belong first in tribal court, and that the

20. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' JurisdictionalDetermination:
Towards Co-existence, Understandingand Respect Between Different Culturaland JudicialNorms, 24
N.M. L. REv. 191 (1994).
21. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403,436 (1994). The author states:
In applying his interpretive method to Indian law, Scalia is implicitly claiming that the
legitimate basis of Congress' authority over the Indians is the same as that which justifies
Congress' general authority over non-Indians.... [E]ven when taken on its own terms,
[Scalia's theory of legitimation] cannot plausibly be applied to the special area of Indian
law.
[Scalia] begins with a method developed in other areas of the law and then
blithely transfers it to the field of Indian affairs. In that transmission, he never stops to
consider whether the shift in field might also involve a shift in the nature of Congress'
authority, and so a shift in the proper interpretive strategy. Yakima Indian Nation thus
skids along on an unarticulated but indispensable assumption that Congress' authority is
fundamentally unitary.
Id. at 436, 438-39.
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federal court ought rarely enjoin this entirely proper tribal process, there
remains the question of which cases belong there. I will admit to being a
little frustrated by the analyses of both Lynn Slade and Bob Clinton
about which non-Indian abstention doctrine is more like the National
Farmers Union abstention doctrine, on the problematic-to-me theory
that if we knew that then we'd know what to do.
I prefer a legislative to a common-law solution, 2 2 for then one
realizes that the fundamental questions must be addressed directly, and
not merely by way of common law analogy: When do we want the
litigation to begin, and proceed to conclusion, in tribal court? When and
in which extraordinary situations will we depart from that general rule
and let the federal court step in prematurely? When don't we care?
Which, of course, brings us nearly full circle in these questionsin-conclusion, for if we-we theorists, that is-don't care in certain
circumstances in which court the litigation goes on, then forum shopping
by the litigators is appropriate. The questions of personal jurisdiction
and the cross-boundary enforceability of any eventual judgment, of
course, remain. But, to a large extent, we are back where we began,
which seems fitting, given the wide-ranging, thought-provoking
discussions that have come before us in this Symposium.
Those are my questions-in-conclusion to this Symposium on one
obscure case and its fascinating variations. If there are those who say
that these questions demonstrate, more than anything else, my own
puzzlement about the issues, I will not dissent. Indian law must be
puzzling, for the only other alternative is that the differences represented
by the existence of the tribes within the dominant society must disappear
or be ignored. Those options being neither available nor wise,
enigmatic, confounding, sometimes awkward, regularly cryptic doctrines
are all that remain. This Symposium has cleared the air and advanced
the understanding of what came before, and left behind more of the
same.
I end with what I am sure is a unanimous expression of thanks from
the participants in the Symposium. to Dean W. Jeremy Davis of the
University of North Dakota School of Law; to the faculty of the law
school, several of whom have been with us along the way, both on the
panels and in the audience; to Jennifer Stokley, Editor-in-Chief, and

22. I called this legislative action a "removal statute,' after the name of similar statutes which
allow for removal from state to federal courts. The unseemliness of this rubric-given the
disagreeable use to which the word "removal" has been put in Indian law-honestly did not occur to

me at the time I first used it. Perhaps a "disengagement statute" would be a better phrase for a law that
requires either the federal, state or tribal court to disengage itself from the case so that the litigation
can commence or continue elsewhere.
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Angela Elsperger, Symposium Editor, of the North Dakota Law Review,
and to their staff, special mention owing to Nick Chase, Chair of the
Arrangements Committee, who looked after our every need.
And - this perhaps more personally from me than unanimously
from the others - thanks to Grand Forks itself, for all of its charming
unpretentiousness, its April wind from the north, its seemingly infinite
view to the west, its river that flows from the south, and, in the east, what
else?, Whitey's.
And, with the mention of those miraculous constants in an otherwise
changing world, I bring this Symposium to a close.

